We use fiscal cliff and the expiration of the Bush tax cuts at the end of 2012 to test whether investors value firms' responsiveness to the demand for dividends. We examine the threeday stock price reaction to the announcement of special dividends and dividend accelerations in November and December of 2012. This setting provides a shock to the demand for dividends where the signaling implications of dividend announcements are substantially mitigated or absent. We find evidence that the price reaction to both special dividends and dividend accelerations is significantly larger than would be explained by tax savings alone. We also find evidence that firms who do not respond to this demand yet appear to have the resources to do so experience significantly negative abnormal returns. The magnitude of the difference in market reaction between payers and non-payers is significantly greater than the maximum economic benefits from the potential tax savings. Overall, our evidence is consistent with investors placing a premium on firms that respond to shareholder demands for a return of capital, consistent with the notion that firms rationally cater to the demand for dividends.
Introduction
In late 2012, the impending "fiscal cliff", a combination of government spending cuts and the expiration of the Bush tax cuts, created an exogenous shock that increased investor demand for dividends. The primary source of this demand was the projected increase in the dividend tax rate scheduled to occur in 2013, although demand could also have increased because fiscal cliff uncertainty lowered investor risk tolerance or depressed sentiment about future growth.
1 As such, the end of 2012 provided a reasonably short window in which firms could choose to respond to shareholder tax incentives by altering their payout policy. Consistent with firms responding to these incentives, Hanlon and Hoopes (2012) find an increase in special dividends when investors expect an increase in dividend tax rates.
What is not clear, however, is whether investors value this responsiveness beyond the tax savings generated from the change in payout policy. Baker and Wurgler (2004) suggest a catering theory of dividends, where firms rationally respond to time-varying investor demand for dividends.
They use several broad proxies for the dividend premium (e.g. the market-to-book of payers versus non-payers) and find that dividend initiations are positively related to the premium. Their evidence, however, focuses on firms' responses to variation in the dividend premium, not on whether investors value firms' catering behavior. Importantly, a condition to prevent their model from unraveling is that the market rewards managers for responding to the demand for dividends.
However, they are unable to find a significant association between announcement returns and the dividend premium. Li and Lie (2006) expand the model of Baker and Wurgler (2004) to include dividend increases and decreases. Using the expanded model, Li and Lie (2006) find evidence that three-day abnormal stock returns to dividend increases (decreases) are positively (negatively) associated with the dividend premium around these announcements. Although this evidence supports Baker and Wurgler (2004) , the primary shortcoming of the Li and Lie (2006) analysis is the endogeneity of the dividend changes and the signal that is sent to the market. For example, if the dividend premium is correlated with uncertainty about future earnings, then the signaling aspect of dividend increases (decreases) would be greater in periods when the premium is greater, generating a more positive (negative) response in these periods. 2 In this paper, we use a setting with an exogenous demand shock where the signaling aspect of the payout is substantially mitigated or removed completely. Specifically, we use the tax-motivated demand for dividends in 2012 and examine the market reaction to (i) firms that pay a special dividend; (ii) firms that accelerate 2013 dividends without changing their total payout; and (iii) firms that do neither, despite having the resources and available cash.
This setting has several advantages for testing whether investors value responsiveness.
First, the fiscal cliff is an exogenous shock to the demand for dividends, removing much of the signaling aspect of dividends that affects the market response to other dividend announcements. 3 Additionally, the change in shareholder level taxes provides a boundary on the maximum possible economic savings to shareholders from reduced taxes. By quantifying and removing the maximum economic benefit from tax savings, we can attribute the incremental response to responsiveness or 2 Consistent with this notion, Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) include various control variables such as asset growth, ROA, and size and show that the results of Baker and Wurgler do not hold after including these controls. Although Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) do not reexamine the results in Li and Lie (2006) , their results raise the possibility that the dividend premium proxy could be correlated with aggregate uncertainty. 3 Signaling is more pronounced for regular dividend increases than special dividends because of the commitment involved with regular dividends. Although firms could have used these special dividends to signal private information, the substantial increase in the frequency of dividends coincident with the heightened investor demand for tax reasons suggests the majority of these dividends were paid in response to this investor demand. a catering premium. 4 For example, in perhaps our cleanest setting, firms that accelerate their dividends without changing the payout amount should signal no new information about firm value, yet they are responding to the investor demand. This helps us interpret any price reaction above the maximum possible tax savings as a premium for responsiveness.
Second, the fiscal cliff was salient and well publicized, and the potential tax effects were sufficiently large and unresolved to generate an expectation of responsiveness by investors. As a result, a number of firms either paid a special dividend (n=193) or accelerated dividends into 2012 (n=133). The combination of having a salient investor demand and reasonably large sample size should provide enough statistical power to detect a premium for responding to shareholder tax incentives if it exists. Additionally, the prominence of the investor demand led several investment banks to disseminate and discuss which firms were expected to pay special dividends. For example, Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, and UBS each created and released lists of companies that they predicted to pay a special dividend. 5 We use these lists to generate a set of expected payers, and study the price reaction to the firms that are expected to pay but ex-post do not. The identification of these firms is particularly helpful because we do not know how much of an expectation of paying a special dividend is already impounded in price. By differencing the price response for the portfolio of payers versus non-payers, we essentially remove the expectation for 4 We deliberately use a conservative measure of the maximum tax savings, assuming (i) dividend taxes revert to the highest possible tax rate of 43.4 percent (Cheng 2012) ; (ii) the tax savings apply to all investors (or the marginal investor), and (iii) there is no expectation of a special dividend payment already incorporated into stock price, (iv) zero present value cost from accelerating dividends taxes into the current year. We chose this approach to ensure that we remove the maximum possible tax savings from the stock price reaction. If any of these do not hold, the actual price reaction attributable to taxes should be smaller. 5 See Appendix A for the companies predicted to issue a special dividend per the lists released by Goldman Sachs, Deustche Bank, and UBS.
payment that is embedded in price, assuming it is relatively constant across the two groups. 6 This allows us to compare the reaction of the firms that respond to investor demand to those that do not.
Our analysis starts by examining the three-day market adjusted return for firms that issue special dividends and firms that accelerate dividends. Using firm-specific dividend yields, we remove the maximum benefit from tax savings and examine whether there remains a significantly positive tax-adjusted price reaction. If investors value responsiveness, we expect to see significantly positive returns above the tax savings generated. Next, we create a special dividend prediction model to identify firms that were viewed as potential special dividend candidates. This model includes cash balance, free cash flow, leverage, current dividend policy, past special dividends, institutional ownership, and recent stock performance. We use the results from this model to form a portfolio of firms that were expected to pay special dividends but ex-post did not.
We compare the stock returns of the portfolio of payers to the portfolio of firms expected to pay but ex post did not over the final two months of 2012. This window captures the price reaction to firms paying special dividends as well as the reaction to the realization that non-payers did not issue one. Finally, in an effort to rule out private information signaling about firm value, we examine variation in the market response to special dividends using proxies for information asymmetry.
Our results are as follows. For the sample of special dividends, we find that the three-day value-weighted market adjusted announcement period returns are 1.98%. The theoretical tax benefit of the special dividends should equal the present value of the one-time tax savings. Under the assumptions discussed in footnote 4, the theoretical upper bound of the tax savings would be 6 Notice that if the expectation that is built into price is larger for the firms that ex-post pay a special dividend, then this approach will bias against finding that investors price responsiveness.
28.4% of the dividend, using the maximum expected change in dividend tax rate of 43.4% minus the current 15% tax rate. After subtracting the maximum possible tax savings, the average threeday value-weighted market adjusted returns is 0.69% and statistically significant, indicating that the positive market reaction to special dividends is greater than can be explained by the maximum potential tax savings. Stated differently, the three-day value-weighted raw returns are 67.7% of the special dividend yield, while the maximum tax reaction should be 28.4%, indicating that the positive market reaction is greater than is explained by tax savings.
Similarly, for the sample of accelerated dividend announcements, the three-day valueweighted market adjusted announcement period returns are 0.83%. After subtracting the maximum possible tax savings resulting from the dividend acceleration, the three-day valueweighted market adjusted returns are 0.65%, indicating that the positive market reaction to the acceleration of dividends is also greater than can be explained by the maximum potential tax savings. In this setting, the three-day value-weighted raw returns are 112.4% of the accelerated dividend yield compared to the maximum tax reaction of 28.4%.
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For the tests utilizing the set of expected payers, we find that our prediction model performs well. For example, the mean prediction score of special dividend payers is in the 95 th percentile of all prediction model scores. We find that firms identified by the prediction model as highly likely to pay a special dividend experience significantly negative returns during the month of December as the market realizes they will not be paying a special dividend. Moreover, the difference between the payers and the non-payers is substantial, with a value-weighted difference in the portfolio returns between the payers and the non-payers of 8.97% between November 1, 2012 and December 31, 2012. Finally, to help rule out the possibility that our results reflect the revelation of private information, we examine whether the price reaction varies with proxies for information asymmetry. Using size and bid-ask spread as proxies for information asymmetry, we find no significant difference in returns across the groups.
We interpret our findings as evidence that investors value responsiveness to shareholder demands. Although Baker and Wurgler (2004) suggest that firms cater to the demand for dividends, they do not find evidence that the market reacts differentially to dividend initiations when the dividend premium is high. Li and Lie (2006) find evidence that the market reaction to dividend changes is related to the dividend premium, but they use regular dividend increases and decreases. Given that Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) argue the dividend premium reflects a proxy for risk and not investor demand for payout, the results in Li and Lie (2006) could be explained by investors placing a higher premium on dividend increases in periods of higher risk, which would be a different interpretation than investors valuing firm responsiveness to the demand for dividends. Our findings validate the results in Baker and Wurgler (2004) and Li and Lie (2006) , as we find evidence that investors value responsiveness even when there is little or no signaling implications.
Prior Literature
Modigliani and Miller (1961) show that firm value in a perfect and efficient market is unaffected by dividend policy. Thus, if dividend policy were to affect firm value, it must be because of a market imperfection such as taxes, information asymmetry, or agency costs. Modigliani and Miller (1961) do note that the tax differential between dividends and capital gains is the most systematic market imperfection. Subsequent research has examined the implications that the market imperfections could have on firm value and dividend policy. Brickley (1983) was the earliest paper to examine how the information content of a specially designated ("labeled") dividend differs from that of a regular ("unlabeled") dividend increase. Unlabeled dividend increases convey more positive information as evidenced by greater market returns around announcement. Unlabeled dividend increases were also associated with greater future earnings and dividend increases than specially designated dividends. However, Brickley (1983) finds specially designated dividends still appear to convey positive information as market returns suggest they indicate more than a transitory increase in dividends and earnings. An analysis of future earnings and dividend increases following a specially designated dividend confirm this conclusion.
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A. Special Dividends
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000) study the evolution of special dividend practices and find that special dividends were once commonly paid but have become much rarer in recent years. While the overall prevalence of special dividends declined, the incidence of very large special dividends actually increased. The authors surmise that the decline in special dividends reflects the principle that dividends are only a useful signal if they convey private information to shareholders. Since firms historically paid special dividends almost as habitually as regular dividends, their ability to signal information via dividends was impeded. The authors speculate that firms dropped the special dividend label over time and embedded recurring special dividends into regular dividends as investors likely viewed special and regular dividends as near substitutes.
This would also explain why large special dividends survived as their sheer size would allow investors to differentiate them from regular dividends.
To further analyze the signal content of special dividends, DeAngelo et al. (2000) examine the market reaction to special dividend announcements. They find that announcement returns are on average positive but are not systematically related to the sign or magnitude of the change from the prior special dividend payment. Although the event study analysis indicates special dividends convey good news to the market, any signaling content is limited as both special dividend increases and decreases generate similar returns. Overall, the authors question the ability of special dividends to serve as an economically important signal. We expect that special dividends are even less likely to serve as a signal about fundamentals when the special dividends are tax motivated.
B. Effect of Dividend Taxation on Payout Policy
Prior studies have documented that shareholder-level taxes impact firm payout policy. 
C. Catering Theory of Dividends
Baker and Wurgler (2004) relax the market efficiency assumption and propose a catering theory of dividends. The theory relies on investors who have a time-varying demand for dividendpaying stocks. Limits to arbitrage allow the uninformed demand to drive prices from fundamentals. As a result, managers rationally cater to investor demand by paying dividends when investors pay a premium for dividends and not paying dividends when investors prefer non-payers.
Using four stock price-based measures of the dividend premium, Baker and Wurgler (2004) find non-payers tend to initiate dividends when the dividend premium is high and payers tend to omit dividends when the dividend premium is low. Time variation in the dividend premium is presumed to represent time variation in investor demand for dividend payers. Baker and Wurgler (2004) offer several potential sources for the time variation in investor demand for dividend payers including variation in investor risk tolerance, sentiment about growth options, and tax code changes. They find evidence consistent with sentiment being a key factor in the demand for dividends.
The Baker and Wurgler (2004) catering theory predicts returns to dividend announcements are increasing in the dividend premium. To put it differently, investors should reward firms to a greater degree during periods when their appetite for dividends is strongest. However, Baker and
Wurgler do not find a significant association between returns to dividend announcements and their proxies for the dividend premium. Li and Lie (2006) extend the analysis in Baker and Wurgler to examine dividend increases and decreases and find the market reaction to dividend changes is associated with the dividend premium. A primary concern with Li and Lie (2006) is whether the dividend premium is correlated with uncertainty about future earnings. If so, then the signaling aspect of dividend changes could also explain the association between returns to dividend changes and the dividend premium. We take advantage of a unique setting where the dividend premium is clearly heightened to reexamine whether firms are rewarded for responding to investor demand.
The fiscal cliff is an exogenous shock to the demand for dividends that removes much of the signaling element of dividends that confounds the market response to other dividend announcements.
Sample Description and Descriptive Statistics
A. Sample Selection
We identify our sample of special dividend payers and dividend accelerators using various sources. To identify special dividends we use the CRSP U.S. Stock Database and Markit, a financial information services company. Similar to DeAngelo et al. (2000) and Hanlon and Hoopes (2012) , special dividends are identified in CRSP using the distribution codes 1262 and 1272 which represent "US cash dividend, year-end or final, taxable same rate as dividends" and "US cash dividend, extra or special, taxable same rate as dividends". Following the aforementioned papers, we also restrict the sample to securities with share codes equal to 10 or 11 to exclude REITs, ADRs, companies incorporated outside the U.S., and closed-end funds. 9 Using this methodology, we identified 108 such special dividends in November and December of 2012 which is comparable to the 90 special dividends identified in November and December of 2010 by Hanlon and Hoopes (2012) . Given their conclusion that firm payout policy was responsive to a dividend tax rate change, it is clear that firms responded similarly at the end of 2012 since even more special dividends were paid.
Markit compiled a list of 189 companies that paid a special dividend in November or December of 2012. 10 We remove 10 companies that do not have a share code equal to 10 or 11.
When comparing the special dividends from the Markit list to the CRSP sample, there is substantial overlap. However, the remaining special dividends from the Markit list do not appear in the CRSP sample because they are coded as regular dividends in CRSP. To confirm that they are in fact special dividends, we examine the press releases or Form 8-Ks announcing the dividends. Without exception, all dividends identified by Markit were in fact special dividends according to the dividend announcements. This finding indicates that prior studies relying on CRSP distribution codes to identify special dividends may have understated the true number of special dividends. To ensure that dividend amounts and declaration dates are correct, we manually check the dividend announcement of any observations for which the amount and date do not match between Markit and CRSP.
9 One reason these entities have been excluded in past studies is their dividends may not be qualified for the reduced dividend tax rate under the JGRRTA. Thus, the expiration of the Bush tax cuts would not provide these entities with a shock in shareholder demand for dividends. 10 A December 19, 2012 article "Tracking Companies' Special Dividends" in the Wall Street Journal includes the list of special dividend payers provided by Markit. According to the article, Markit uses the following methodology to construct the list: "For its list, Markit compiles data from more than 3,300 U.S.-listed companies representing constituents of the Russell 3000, S&P 1500 and Nasdaq 100 indices. Special dividends are listed on the day after they are declared by the issuing companies. observations. Many of these observations were firms that paid a special dividend at the end of 2010 which was also likely tax-motivated. Furthermore, our interest lies in the benefits to catering dividend policy to shareholder-level taxes. If any of these special dividends were anticipated by the market because the firm paid a special dividend in the prior two years, announcement period returns would be muted and understate the true benefits to having a dividend policy that is responsive to shareholder-level taxes.
To identify the sample of dividend accelerations, we searched CRSP for firms that paid two dividends during October to December of 2012 under the assumption that the second dividend paid might be an acceleration of a dividend regularly scheduled to be paid in 2013. We then read the press release or Form 8-K to determine if the dividend was an acceleration of a dividend scheduled to be paid in 2013. This process produced a sample of 124 dividend accelerations. We also searched financial news sources to gather additional dividend accelerations yielding another 17 observations. Finally, we removed 8 observations because the dividend acceleration was accompanied by a regular dividend increase, resulting in a final sample of 133 dividend accelerations.
To obtain a sample of non-paying firms to include in the logistic regression for the special dividend prediction model, all observations with a fiscal period ending in July, August, or 
Empirical Results
A. Returns for Special Dividend Payers
We start by examining the market reaction to firms that paid special dividends in late 2012. Table 3 shows the announcement window returns of an equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolio of special dividend payers. We first calculate statistical significance using the test statistic in Baker and Wurgler (2004) . Baker and Wurgler (2004, p. 1140) scale each firm's threeday excess return by the square root of three times the standard deviation of its daily excess returns, measured over 120 calendar days ending five trading days before the announcement date.
However, Kothari and Warner (2005) note that this procedure can yield test statistics that result in greater significance than in-sample standard deviations because announcement window standard deviations are larger than the pre-event window standard deviations. To be conservative, we calculate a test statistic using in-sample standard deviation which results in lower t-statistics because of the higher event window variance. Therefore, all significance levels reported are based on using the in-sample standard deviation of the announcement period returns.
The equal-weighted raw returns of special dividend payers are 2.62% over the three-day window centered on the special dividend announcement. After adjusting for the equal-weighted CRSP portfolio, the three-day market adjusted returns are 2.40%. Results are similar when using the value-weighted portfolio of special dividend payers. The value-weighted raw returns of special dividend payers are 2.58% over the three-day window centered on the special dividend announcement. After adjusting for the value-weighted CRSP portfolio, the three-day market adjusted returns are 1.98%. All are significantly positive at the 1% level. The returns to special dividend announcements in November and December of 2012 also appear to be larger than the historical market reaction to special dividend announcements. For example, DeAngelo et al.
(2000) document an average stock market reaction over the period 1962 to 1995 of 1% when a firm announces a special dividend but leaves the regular dividend unchanged.
Disregarding the discounting of future tax payments, the theoretical upper bound on the tax benefit of paying a dividend in 2012 versus waiting until after the Bush tax cuts expire would be 28.4% of the dividend. However, it is unlikely that investors expected the worst case scenario of the dividend tax rate increasing from 15% to 43.4%. Furthermore, adjusting for present value implications would only reduce the tax benefit of paying a dividend in 2012 as the payment of dividend taxes is being accelerated. This upper bound estimate also assumes an expectation of a special dividend has not already been impounded into price. Therefore, 28.4% of the dividend is a conservative upper bound estimate of the tax benefit of paying a dividend in 2012 before the Bush tax cuts expire.
After subtracting the maximum possible tax savings [28.4% x SPECIALYIELD], the threeday value-weighted market adjusted returns are 0.69% and statistically significant at the 5% level.
In untabulated analysis, we compute the raw returns as a percentage of the special dividend yield.
The three-day value-weighted raw returns are 67.7% of the special dividend yield, while the maximum tax savings related reaction would be 28.4%. This finding indicates that paying a special dividend prior to a dividend tax increase generates benefits that are not fully explained by the change in the dividend tax rate.
In terms of economic significance, special dividend payers on average experience a gain of $57.3 million in market capitalization over the three-day special dividend announcement window. Despite over half of the special dividend announcements occurring in November, special dividend paying firms continue to experience abnormally positive returns throughout the month of December. Figure 1 indicates that the equal-weighted (value-weighted) portfolio of special dividend payers generates positive abnormal returns of 5.26% (4.66%) over November and December.
[INSERT 
B. Returns for Dividend Accelerations
We next examine the market reaction to firms that accelerated dividend payments into 2012. Unlike special dividends which may contain an information signal, a dividend acceleration provides no new information to investors other than a willingness of the firm to respond to shareholder-level tax incentives. Table 4 shows the announcement period returns of the dividend accelerations for both equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios. For both portfolios, the three-day raw and market-adjusted returns are all significantly positive at a 1% level. To determine if the returns are indicative of a benefit to responsiveness, we again remove the maximum possible tax savings. Tax-adjusted returns are calculated by subtracting the maximum possible tax benefit [28.4% x ACCELYIELD] from the raw and market-adjusted returns.
Focusing on the equal-weighted portfolio, Panel A shows tax-adjusted raw returns of 0.59%, significantly positive at the 1% level. Using the CRSP value-weighted portfolio to calculate abnormal returns, the tax-adjusted returns of 0.27% are significantly positive at the 10% level. The tax-adjusted returns are not significantly positive when using the CRSP equal-weighted portfolio to calculate abnormal returns. Focusing on the value-weighted portfolio, Panel B
indicates that the tax-adjusted returns are all significantly positive at the 1% level whether we use raw returns, CRSP value-weighted adjusted returns, or CRSP equal-weighted adjusted returns (1.14%, 0.65%, and 0.73% respectively).
To ensure that the value-weighted results are not disproportionately affected by a few large companies, we also remove any observations that account for over 10% of the value-weighted portfolio (Walmart, Oracle, and Cisco). Untabulated results indicate the tax-adjusted returns of this modified portfolio all remain significantly positive at a 5% level. Overall, the results in Table   4 demonstrate the returns to accelerating a dividend exceed the maximum possible investor tax savings. Since a dividend acceleration provides no new information to investors about firm value, we interpret these results as indicative of a distinct benefit to being responsive to shareholder-level tax incentives.
[
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
C. Returns for Non-Payers from Investment Bank Prediction Lists
To determine the costs of not responding to shareholder-level tax incentives, we start with a set of firms that were in published investment banking reports as predicted to pay a special dividend. Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, and UBS each created and released lists of companies that they predicted to pay a special dividend. Out of the 36 firms included on the prediction lists, 22 did not pay a special dividend. Because the goal of this analysis is to determine the costs of not being responsive, we also remove the 6 firms that accelerated a dividend. Table 5 shows the December returns of an equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolio of these non-payers. The equal-weighted (value-weighted) portfolio of non-payers experiences abnormal returns of -2.05%
(-2.73%) over the month of December. Only the abnormal returns of the value-weighted portfolio are marginally significant at the 10% level in part because of the small sample size of 16. 11 In terms of economic significance, non-payers from the investment bank prediction lists lost on average $192.7 million in market capitalization during December. The loss in market capitalization for these non-payers occurred despite the overall market performing well during the month of December -the equal-weighted (value-weighted) CRSP portfolio experienced positive returns of 2.18% (1.25%) during the month.
To compare the negative returns to the maximum foregone tax benefits of not paying a special dividend, we multiply the value-weighted mean special dividend yield of the payers by the maximum possible increase in the dividend tax rate (4.36% x 28.4% = 1.24%). Thus, if the market fully expected the non-payers from the prediction lists to pay a special dividend, the maximum penalty implied by the foregone tax savings would be a return of -1.24%. The equal-weighted and value-weighted December abnormal returns are more negative than -1.24% suggesting the penalty for failing to respond to shareholder demand for a special dividend is greater than can be explained by the change in the dividend tax rate.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] [INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
When comparing the returns of the portfolio of non-payers to the returns of the portfolio of payers in Figure 1 , the costs faced by firms not paying a special dividend are even starker. The difference in November and December cumulative abnormal returns between the equal-weighted (value-weighted) portfolios of payers and non-payers is 9.55% (6.09%). The significant negative returns of the non-payers from the investment bank prediction lists could be a result of being included on the lists in the first place. To determine if these results are unique to the firms included on the investment bank special dividend prediction lists, we next examine the returns of other firms that may have been viewed by the market as likely to pay a special dividend.
D. Returns for Non-payers using Special Dividend Prediction Model
In order to identify firms that were viewed by the market as likely to pay a special dividend, we model the decision to pay a special dividend. We estimate a logistic regression of an indicator variable for paying a special dividend during the sample period (SPECIAL = 1 or 0) on a set of variables predicted to be associated with the likelihood of paying a special dividend. The predictor variables used in the model come from prior research as well as the factors identified in the investment bank reports that were used to identify the predicted payers. We estimate the following indicate larger firms are more likely to disburse cash via a self-tender offer versus a special dividend. Therefore, we do not make a directional prediction for size. We expect a positive coefficient on CASHASSETS and FCF as a firm with a higher cash-to-assets ratio and greater free cash flows is more able to pay a special dividend. We expect a negative coefficient on LEV as a highly levered firm is less likely to pay a special dividend. Fama and French (2001) find that dividends are less likely for firms with more investment opportunities implying a negative coefficient on MTB if the market-to-book ratio is an accurate proxy for investment opportunities.
On the other hand, Lie and Lie (1999) show that a high market-to-book ratio increases the likelihood that a firm disburses cash via a special dividend as opposed to a self-tender offer. As a result, we do not make a directional prediction for MTB.
We anticipate a firm is more likely to pay a special dividend if it pays regular dividends or has paid a special dividend in the past; therefore, a positive coefficient is expected for REGULAR and PASTSPECIAL. We expect a positive coefficient on PASTPERF as recent stock performance is likely correlated with profitability and the ability to pay a special dividend. In addition,
PASTPERF may act as a proxy for capital gains. Lie and Lie (1999) show that recent capital gains increases the likelihood that a firm chooses to disburse cash via a special dividend as opposed to a self-tender offer. Prior research has shown that firm payout policy is more responsive to shareholder tax incentives in the presence of large institutional owners [Lie and Lie (1999); Chetty and Saez (2005)]. However, large institutional owners may not face the same tax incentives as individual shareholders and may not demand a special dividend before the change in dividend tax rates; thus, we do not make a prediction for the coefficient on INST_OWN/HIGH_INST.
The results of the logistic regression for the special dividend prediction model are presented in Table 6 . Column 1 presents the results before including the institutional ownership variable.
SIZE has a negative but insignificant coefficient. As predicted, the coefficients for both CASHASSETS and FCF are positive and significant at the 5% level and 1% level respectively. A higher proportion of assets held in cash and greater free cash flows increase the likelihood that a firm pays a special dividend. The coefficient on LEV is significantly negative at the 1% level as expected indicating a highly levered firm is less likely to pay a special dividend. The two dummy variables reflecting a firm's past dividend policy, REGULAR and PASTSPECIAL, are highly positive and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on PASTSPECIAL can be interpreted as a firm is over 10 times more likely to pay a special dividend if it issued a special dividend in the past two years. The coefficient on PASTPERF is significantly positive at the 5% level demonstrating that a firm experiencing recent strong stock performance is more likely to pay a special dividend.
After including institutional ownership variables in Column 2-4, the direction and significance of the other explanatory variables remain unchanged. The coefficient on INST_OWN in Column 2 and the coefficient on HIGH_INST in Column 3 are negative but insignificant while the coefficient on HIGH_INST2 is negative and significant at the 5% level. We suspect the negative coefficient might be due to large non-taxable institutional owners that would have no incentive to demand a special dividend before the impending change in the dividend tax rate. Lisowsky (2010)]. Overall, the model appears to perform well in identifying firms that were viewed by the market as likely to pay a special dividend. If the model incorrectly identifies a firm as likely to pay a special dividend when the market did not view the firm as a special dividend candidate, it would bias against finding significant results in our returns analysis.
[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] To examine the returns of firms that did not pay a special dividend but were likely viewed by the market as able to pay a special dividend, we select the firms with a prediction model score in the top decile. We then remove firms that responded to the heightened investor demand for dividends by either paying a special dividend or accelerating a dividend. This procedure yields a sample of 212 non-paying firms. Table 7 shows the December returns of an equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolio of these non-payers. Both portfolios of non-payers experience significantly negative abnormal returns over the month of December. The significant negative returns indicate that the market reacts negatively when a firm forgoes the opportunity to cater payout policy to a change in shareholder level taxes. In terms of economic significance, nonpayers that ex-ante were likely viewed by the market as a special dividend candidate lost on average $222.9 million in market capitalization during December. The loss in market capitalization for these non-payers occurred while the rest of the market performed well during the month of December.
Again, we compare the negative returns to the maximum foregone tax benefits of not paying a special dividend. If the market fully expected these non-payers to pay a special dividend, the maximum penalty implied by the foregone tax savings would be a return of -1.24% (mean value-weighted dividend yield 4.36% x 28.4% tax rate change). Similar to the returns of the nonpayers from the prediction lists, the equal-weighted and value-weighted December abnormal returns of the non-payers from the prediction model are more negative than -1.24%. This suggests the penalty for failing to respond to shareholder demand for a special dividend is greater than can be explained by the change in the dividend tax rate.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
We next explore the pattern of cumulative abnormal returns throughout the months of November and December. As can be seen in Figure 2 , the value-weighted portfolio of non-payers experiences most of the negative abnormal returns in the first two weeks of December. Any negative market reaction stemming from the decision to not pay a special dividend would likely be impounded in price by the latest date a firm could feasibly be expected to announce a special dividend and still be able to pay it before the end of the year. Since the last special dividend announcement in our sample was on December 14, 2012, we expect the negative returns to be concentrated in time before mid-December, consistent with Figure 2 . The returns of the equalweighted portfolio of non-payers are less negative than the returns of the value-weighted portfolio, and the negative abnormal returns do not appear to be as concentrated in early December.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
Figure 2 also shows the returns for the portfolio of special dividend payers. The difference in returns between the two sets of portfolios provides an estimate of the net benefit from responding to shareholder demand. The advantage of this approach is that differencing the two portfolios allows us to remove the expectation of paying a special dividend that might already be impounded in price. Although this assumes the expectation of paying a dividend is equal for payers and nonpayers, if the expectation impounded into price is greater for firms that ex-post pay a special dividend, it will bias against finding our result. Although this is not an ex-ante tradeable strategy, using perfect foresight would yield an equal-weighted (value-weighted) hedge portfolio return with a long position in special dividend payers and short position in non-payers of 6.99% (8.97%) over November and December.
E. Information Asymmetry Partitions
The signaling theory of dividends is based on the notion that management has private information regarding the firm, and regular dividend initiations or increases convey this private information to the market. If a special dividend paid during November or December of 2012 signals management's private information, the information signal should be strongest for firms with high levels of information asymmetry. This also suggests the market should react more positively to a special dividend announced by a high information asymmetry firm than to a special dividend announced by a low information asymmetry firm. Likewise, the absence of a special dividend should send the strongest negative signal for firms with high levels of information asymmetry. Thus, one would expect the market to react more negatively to nonpayment of a special dividend for high information asymmetry firms if nonpayment does in fact provide an information signal.
To determine if special dividends signal management's private information, we partition the payers and non-payers using two proxies for information asymmetry: market capitalization and bid-ask spread. A firm is considered to have high information asymmetry if it is has a below median market capitalization or above median bid-ask spread. Panel A of Table 8 shows that the returns of payers are not significantly different across the low and high information asymmetry partitions. Contrary to what would be expected if special dividends signaled positive private information, the returns of high information asymmetry payers are lower than the returns of low information asymmetry payers. Panel B of Table 8 shows that the returns of non-payers are also not significantly different across the low and high information asymmetry partitions. We interpret the results of Table 8 as suggesting that special dividends, specifically tax-motivated special dividends, are not priced in a manner that suggests they convey management's private information about firm value.
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]
Conclusion
The fiscal cliff and the expiration of the Bush tax cuts at the end of 2012 created uncertainty regarding future economic conditions, government spending, and the dividend tax rate. These events led to a surge of special dividends and dividend accelerations in the final months of 2012.
We use this setting to examine whether investors reward firms that accommodate investor demand by issuing a special dividend or accelerating dividends and we calibrate the magnitude of the market reaction to the economic benefit to investors from reduced taxes.
Significant positive returns surrounding special dividend announcements in November and
December of 2012 provide evidence of the benefits to responding to investor demand for dividends. We find that the positive returns are greater than can be explained solely by the shareholder-level tax savings related to paying the dividend before the increase in dividend tax rates. Announcement period returns indicate special dividend payers experience an average increase in market capitalization of $57.3 million during the 3-days centered on the special dividend announcement. We also find that returns to dividend accelerations are greater than can be explained solely by the shareholder-level tax savings. While special dividends could provide an information signal to investors, an acceleration of a dividend only provides information regarding the firm's willingness to respond to shareholder-level tax incentives.
To identify firms that were likely viewed by the market as special dividend candidates, we model the determinants of the decision to pay a special dividend. We then sort non-paying firms based on their prediction score from the model. We find that firms identified by the prediction model as highly likely to pay a special dividend experience significantly negative returns during the month of December as the market realizes they will not be paying a special dividend. Further, we document a substantial difference between firms that paid a special dividend and the nonpayers from the prediction model, with a value-weighted difference in portfolio returns of 8.97%
between November 1, 2012 and December 31, 2012. Finally, to help rule out the possibility that our results reflect the revelation of private information, we examine whether the price reaction varies with proxies for information asymmetry. Using size and bid-ask spread as proxies for information asymmetry, we find no significant difference in returns across the groups.
Overall, our results indicate there are economically and statistically significant benefits to tailoring firm payout policy in response to a change in shareholder-level dividend taxes.
Alternatively, firms face economically and statistically significant costs if they choose not to respond to a change in shareholder-level dividend taxes. Our results provide additional support for the theories advanced by Baker and Wurgler (2004) and Li and Lie (2006) Three day buy and hold raw returns from the day before the special dividend announcement to the day after.
VWBHAR(-1,1)
Three day buy-and-hold abnormal returns from the day before the special dividend announcement to the day after. Abnormal returns are calculated by adjusting by the returns of a CRSP value-weighted portfolio.
EWBHAR(-1,1)
Three day buy-and-hold abnormal return from the day before the special dividend announcement to the day after. Abnormal returns are calculated by adjusting by the returns of a CRSP equal-weighted portfolio. (-1,1) 0.75% 2.454 *** *, **, and *** denote significantly positive returns at the p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed), respectively. The t-stat was calculated using the standard deviation of the in-sample announcement window returns. (-1,1) 1.320% 6.248 *** VWBHAR (-1,1) 0.826% 3.974 *** EWBHAR (-1,1) 0.907% 4.339 *** TAX_ADJ_RAWBH (-1,1) 1.140% 5.416 *** TAX_ADJ_VWBHAR (-1,1) 0.646% 3.132 *** TAX_ADJ_EWBHAR (-1,1) 0.727% 3.496 *** *, **, and *** denote significantly positive returns at the p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed), respectively. The t-stat was calculated using the standard deviation of the in-sample announcement window returns. 
Special
(1) Coefficient (Std Error) *, **, and *** denote significance at the p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Please see Appendix C for full variable definitions. The high and low information asymmetry partitions are based on market capitalization and bid-ask spread. High information asymmetry firms are those with a market capitalization below the sample median and/or a bidask spread above the sample median.
Returns of the payers are the equal-weighted raw buy-and-hold returns over the (-1,1) window centered on the special dividend announcement date.
Returns of the non-payers are the December monthly returns adjusted by the equal-weighted CRSP portfolio.
The t-stat is calculated using a statistical test of differences in sample mean returns of the low and high information asymmetry samples. Figure 1 shows the cumulative abnormal returns compounded daily over the month of November and December 2012 for the special dividend payers and the non-payers from the prediction lists. Abnormal returns for the equal-weighted (value-weighted) portfolios of the payers and the non-payers are calculated by subtracting the returns of the equal-weighted (value-weighted) CRSP portfolio. Figure 2 shows the cumulative abnormal returns compounded daily over the month of November and December 2012 for the special dividend payers and the non-payers with a prediction score in the top decile. Abnormal returns for the equal-weighted (value-weighted) portfolios of the payers and the non-payers are calculated by subtracting the returns of the equal-weighted (value-weighted) CRSP portfolio. 
Figure 1 -Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Non-Payers from Prediction Lists
